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The effect of subordinated debt and surety bonds on banks' cost of capital and on the value of federal deposit insurance

  • William P. Osterberg
  • James B. Thomson

This paper examines two proposals to correct the risk-taking incentives embedded in the current deposit insurance system and to provide protection to the deposit insurance fund. the first would require banks to issue subordinated debt, and the second would require bank stockholders to post surety bonds. We use the cash-flow version of the Capital Asset Pricing Model to show how each proposal would affect the values and rates of return on uninsured deposits and equity. We then indicate the impact that each proposal would have on the values of the Federal Deposit insurance Corporation claim and on the bank, emphasizing the role of deposit insurance pricing.

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File URL: http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Workpaper/1990/wp9012.pdf
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 9012.

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Date of creation: 1990
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9012
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  1. Gorton, Gary & Santomero, Anthony M, 1990. "Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(1), pages 119-28, February.
  2. William P. Osterberg & James B. Thomson, 1987. "Deposit insurance and the cost of capital," Working Paper 8714, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  3. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
  4. Timothy H. Hannan & Gerald A. Hanweck, 1986. "Bank insolvency risk and the market for large certificates of deposit," Working Papers in Banking, Finance and Microeconomics 86-1, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Ronn, Ehud I & Verma, Avinash K, 1986. " Pricing Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option-Based Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(4), pages 871-95, September.
  6. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "On the cost of deposit insurance when there are surveillance costs," Working papers 903-77., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  7. James B. Thomson, 1987. "FSLIC forbearances to stockholders and the value of savings and loan shares," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q III, pages 26-35.
  8. Pennacchi, George G, 1987. "A Reexamination of the Over- (or Under-) Pricing of Deposit Insurance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 340-60, August.
  9. Avery, Robert B & Belton, Terrence M & Goldberg, Michael A, 1988. "Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(4), pages 597-610, November.
  10. Buser, Stephen A & Chen, Andrew H & Kane, Edward J, 1981. "Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(1), pages 51-60, March.
  11. Herbert Baer & Elijah Brewer, 1986. "Uninsured deposits as a source of market discipline: some new evidence," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Sep, pages 23-31.
  12. Herbert Baer, 1985. "Private prices, public insurance: The pricing of federal deposit insurance," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Sep, pages 45-57.
  13. Edward J. Kane, 1987. "No Room for Weak Links in the Chain of Deposit Insurance Reform," NBER Working Papers 2317, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Edward J. Kane, 1985. "The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262611856, August.
  15. Mark J. Flannery, 1989. "Pricing deposit insurance when the insurer measures risk with error," Proceedings 229, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  16. Chen, Andrew H, 1978. "Recent Developments in the Cost of Debt Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(3), pages 863-77, June.
  17. Edward J. Kane, 1989. "How Incentive-Incompatible Deposit-Insurance Funds Fail," NBER Working Papers 2836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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