Contractual opportunism, limited liability, and the role of financial coalitions
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- Robert M. Townsend, 1978. "Intermediation with Costly Bilateral Exchange," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 45(3), pages 417-425.
- Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
- Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 415-432.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994. "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 841-879.
- Udry, Christopher, 1990. "Credit Markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as Insurance in a Rural Economy," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 4(3), pages 251-69, September.
- John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 1985.
87, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
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