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United We Vote

Author

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  • Jon X. Eguia

    (California Institute of Technology)

Abstract

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the coalition.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon X. Eguia, 2006. "United We Vote," Working Papers 2006.9, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
    2. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
    3. Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1996. "In or out?: Centralization by majority vote," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 43-60, January.
    4. Carlo Carraro (ed.), 2003. "The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2999, March.
    5. Cremer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1997. "Political Confederation," Working Papers 990, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Moselle, Boaz, 2002. "Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative Voting Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 49-87, March.
    7. Crémer, Jacques & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1999. "Political Confederation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(1), pages 69-83, March.
    8. Gelman Andrew, 2003. "Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-14, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jon X. Eguia, 2007. "United We Vote," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 607-639, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Voting bloc; Coalition formation; Voting rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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