Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability
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DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1185
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2019. "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," ISER Discussion Paper 1059, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Jon X. Eguia, 2007.
"United We Vote,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 607-639, August.
- Eguia, Jon X., 2006. "United We Vote," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 12172, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- repec:cup:judgdm:v:10:y:2015:i:6:p:511-537 is not listed on IDEAS
- Jon X. Eguia, 2006. "United We Vote," Working Papers 2006.9, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2019.
"The Winner-Take-All Dilemma,"
ISER Discussion Paper
1059r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2019.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2022. "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," Papers 2206.09574, arXiv.org.
- Daniel A. DeCaro & Marco A. Janssen & Allen Lee, 2015. "Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 10(6), pages 511-537, November.
- Kikuchi, Kazuya & Koriyama, Yukio, 2023. "The winner-take-all dilemma," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
- Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 111-135, September.
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