Forming Voting Blocs and Coalitions as a Prisoner's Dilemma: A Possible Theoretical Explanation for Political Instability
Individuals in a committee or election can increase their voting power by forming coalitions. This behavior is shown here to yield a prisoner's dilemma, in which a subset of voters can increase their power, while reducing average voting power for the electorate as a whole. This is an unusual form of the prisoner's dilemma in that cooperation is the selfish act that hurts the larger group. Under a simple model, the privately optimal coalition size is approximately 1.4 times the square root of the number of voters. When voters' preferences are allowed to differ, coalitions form only if voters are approximately politically balanced. We propose a dynamic view of coalitions, in which groups of voters choose of their own free will to form and disband coalitions, in a continuing struggle to maintain their voting power. This is potentially an endogenous mechanism for political instability, even in a world where individuals' (probabilistic) preferences are fixed and known.
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Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 1-16
| Handle: | RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.2:y:2003:i:1:n:13 |
| Contact details of provider: | Web page: https://www.degruyter.com
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| Order Information: | Web: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap |
References listed on IDEAS
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- Van Kolpin, 2003. "Voting Power Under Uniform Representation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(2), pages 1-5.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
- Donal G. Saari & Katri K. Sieberg, 1999. "Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices," Discussion Papers 1271, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:2:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
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