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A Train to Union: European Common Defense

Author

Listed:
  • Massimo Morelli
  • Eugenio Peluso

Abstract

Geopolitical tensions from Russia and partial US withdrawal highlight the urgent need to boost Europe’s defense and tech autonomyEuropean defense is like a 27-wagon train with a weak locomotive – US pull is fading, and ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030 boosts wagons, not the engineWar resource allocation mirrors the Colonel Blotto game – without flexible response, defense fails. It needs a single command and EU army in placeEasily revived, the 1952 EDC treaty offers a ready, scalable blueprint for an EU army – recognized decades ago, still actionable today, and extendable to other member statesCovid-19 called for swift action within existing rules; lasting global challenges demand institutional reform and deeper political integration

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Morelli & Eugenio Peluso, 2025. "A Train to Union: European Common Defense," EconPol Forum, CESifo, vol. 26(03), pages 29-34, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:epofor:v:26:y:2025:i:03:p:29-34
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guiso, Luigi & Herrera, Helios & Morelli, Massimo, 2016. "Cultural Differences and Institutional Integration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(S1), pages 97-113.
    2. Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 142-175, February.
    3. Luque, Jaime & Morelli, Massimo & Tavares, José, 2014. "A volatility-based theory of fiscal union desirability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-11.
    4. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
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