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The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis

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  • Manuel Serrano-Alarcón

Abstract

Este trabajo analiza las principales alternativas disponibles para organizar los registros públicos, comparando cinco modelos de organización: (1) las burocracias o “centros de gasto discrecional” utilizados para proporcionar servicios privados valiosos en el estado de bienestar; (2) los “mercados internos” introducidos desde los primeros años 1990 para reformarlos; y las soluciones híbridas que habían sido ya utilizadas extensamente por el estado liberal desde el siglo XIX para ofrecer este tipo de servicios que proporcionan utilidad privada, incluyendo entre tales híbridos (3) los “centros de ingresos” basados en el cobro de tasas y tarifas a los usuarios; (4) los sistemas de “franquicia” o “concesión” que retribuyen con el excedente de cada oficina a los funcionarios públicos responsables de ella, que suelen ser aquellos cuyas tareas tienen un mayor contenido profesional; y (5) la variante “privatizadora” contemporánea, en la que el Gobierno contrata la prestación de todo el servicio con una empresa.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel Serrano-Alarcón, 2021. "The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis," Working Papers 2021-13, FEDEA.
  • Handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2021-13
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    References listed on IDEAS

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