IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/eui/euiwps/eco2012-04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

I Prefer Not to Know! Analyzing the Decision of Getting Information about your Ability

Author

Listed:
  • Paulina Granados Zambrano

Abstract

The recognition that information is, most of the time, incomplete and imperfect is essential in understanding the nature of the formation of beliefs. To understand human behavior in the area of (academic) performance, the beliefs individuals sustain about their ability become crucial. Before performing a certain task, the agent never knows his/her true ability. He/she only has an ex-ante notion of his/her believed ability and the truth is only revealed ex-post. Once the true ability is known and the payoffs realized, we observe different reactions that range from disappointment to happiness. The logical question is then, who would have preferred not to know the truth? This paper deals with the information acquisition decisions of individuals who face uncertainty about their own ability. At a theoretical level (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002), it has been shown that overconfident individuals (people with beliefs about themselves higher than reality) with time inconsistent preferences have more at stake when they face the decision of learning the truth about themselves than more pessimistic agents. To test this prediction, a field experiment is designed and implemented, where students face the decision of learning, or not, their true ability before performing a test. It will be shown that overconfident students indeed more often decide not to learn their true ability.

Suggested Citation

  • Paulina Granados Zambrano, 2012. "I Prefer Not to Know! Analyzing the Decision of Getting Information about your Ability," Economics Working Papers ECO2012/04, European University Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2012/04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/20295/ECO_2012_04.pdf?sequence=1
    File Function: main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luigi Guiso & Tullio Jappelli, 2006. "Information Acquisition and Portfolio Performance," CeRP Working Papers 52, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin (Italy).
    2. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 699-746.
    3. Klayman, Joshua & Soll, Jack B. & Gonzalez-Vallejo, Claudia & Barlas, Sema, 1999. "Overconfidence: It Depends on How, What, and Whom You Ask, , , , , , , , ," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 216-247, September.
    4. Bernard Caillaud & Jean Tirole, 2007. "Consensus Building: How to Persuade a Group," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1877-1900, December.
    5. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
    6. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation," International Economic Association Series, in: Bina Agarwal & Alessandro Vercelli (ed.), Psychology, Rationality and Economic Behaviour, chapter 2, pages 19-57, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Willpower and Personal Rules," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 848-886, August.
    8. Guiso, Luigi & Pagel, Michaela, 2004. "The Role of Risk Aversion in Predicting Individual Behaviours," CEPR Discussion Papers 4591, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    10. Richard Deaves & Erik Lüders & Guo Ying Luo, 2009. "An Experimental Test of the Impact of Overconfidence and Gender on Trading Activity," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 13(3), pages 555-575.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Weekly Roundup 170: A Curated Linkfest For The Smartest People On The Web!
      by Miguel in Simoleon Sense on 2012-03-26 08:35:54
    2. Weekly Roundup 170: A Curated Linkfest For The Smartest People On The Web!
      by Miguel in Simoleon Sense on 2012-03-26 08:35:54

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Emir Kamenica & Matthew Gentzkow, 2011. "Bayesian Persuasion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2590-2615, October.
    2. Ishida, Junichiro, 2012. "Contracting with self-esteem concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 329-340.
    3. Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2008. "Who are the trustworthy, we think?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 456-465, December.
    4. Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "Imperfect memory and choice under risk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 127-158.
    5. Elliott Ash & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2015. "Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).
    6. Nyborg, Karine, 2011. "I don't want to hear about it: Rational ignorance among duty-oriented consumers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 263-274, August.
    7. Prüfer, Jens & Xu, Y., 2021. "The Nonprofit's Dilemma," Other publications TiSEM 237785b1-929d-40db-872f-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    9. Brice Corgnet & Brian Gunia & Roberto Hernán González, 2021. "Harnessing the power of social incentives to curb shirking in teams," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 139-167, February.
    10. Danková, Katarína & Servátka, Maroš, 2019. "Gender robustness of overconfidence and excess entry," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 179-199.
    11. Hestermann, Nina & Le Yaouanq, Yves & Treich, Nicolas, 2020. "An economic model of the meat paradox," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    12. Saucet, Charlotte & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Motivated memory in dictator games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 250-275.
    13. Fabrizio Adriani & Silvia Sonderegger, 2018. "The Signaling Value of Punishing Norm-Breakers and Rewarding Norm-Followers," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-32, December.
    14. Benabou, Roland & Jaroszewicz, Ania & Loewenstein, George, 2022. "It Hurts to Ask," IZA Discussion Papers 15576, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2009. "Over My Dead Body: Bargaining and the Price of Dignity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 459-465, May.
    16. Johansson-Stenman, Olof & Svedsäter, Henrik, 2011. "Self-Image and Valuation of Moral Goods: Stated versus Real Willingness to Pay," Working Papers in Economics 484, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    17. Dasgupta, Dyotona & Saha, Anuradha, 2022. "Perceptions, biases, and inequality," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 198-210.
    18. Saori Chiba & Kaiwen Leong, 2016. "Behavioral Economics of Crime Rates and Punishment Levels," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(4), pages 727-754, December.
    19. Jean-Pierre Dubé & Xueming Luo & Zheng Fang, 2017. "Self-Signaling and Prosocial Behavior: A Cause Marketing Experiment," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 36(2), pages 140-156, March.
    20. Roland Bénabou, 2013. "Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 429-462.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    overconfidence; beliefs; ability; information acquisition; field experiment;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2012/04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Cécile Brière (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deiueit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.