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On the Number of alpha-Pivotal Players

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    We show that bounds like those of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky (J. Econ. Theory, 2000) as well as of Gradwohl et al. (Math. Oper. Res., 2009) on the number of alpha-pivotal agents can be obtained by decomposition of variance. All these bounds have a similar asymptotic behaviour, up to constant factors. Our bound is weaker than that of Al-Najjar and Smorodinsky, but we require only pairwise independent—rather than independent—types. Our result strengthens the bound of Gradwohl et al.

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    File URL: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/WP-11-142.pdf
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    Paper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 11/142.

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    Length: 13 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:11-142
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    1. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2007. "Information Acquisition in Committees," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1411R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Al-Najjar, Nabil I., 2001. "A reputational model of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 165-191, October.
    3. Hans Gersbach, 2009. "Democratic Mechanisms," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1436-1469, December.
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