Large Nonanonymous Repeated Games
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- Rob, R., 1988.
"Pollution Claim Settlements Under Private Information,"
19-88, Tel Aviv.
- Rob, Rafael, 1989. "Pollution claim settlements under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 307-333, April.
- George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 351-367.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 318-342, June.
- Sabourian, Hamid, 1990. "Anonymous repeated games with a large number of players and random outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 92-110, June.
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