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On R&D Information Sharing and Merger

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  • Uday Bhanu Sinha

Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly by an innovating firm in the face of a merger with its rival. The innovating firm would share information about the cost realization with its rival provided the market size is relatively small or, the R&D technology is relatively more efficient in a medium market size. However, in a large market, or in a medium market size with less efficient R&D technology, the innovating firm does not share information with its rival. They also show that the social welfare may be higher under incomplete information regime. [Working Paper No. 145]

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  • Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2010. "On R&D Information Sharing and Merger," Working Papers id:2908, eSocialSciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2908
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2013. "On R&D information sharing and merger," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 369-376.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nie, Pu-yan & Wang, Chan & Wen, Hong-xing, 2021. "Horizontal mergers under uniform resource constraints," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2013. "On R&D information sharing and merger," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 369-376.
    3. Yin, Xundong & Wang, Sophie Xuefei & Lu, Yuanzhu & Yan, Jianye, 2023. "Endogenous information acquisition and disclosure of private information in a duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    4. Chen, Feiqiong & Meng, Qiaoshuang & Li, Xueying, 2018. "Cross-border post-merger integration and technology innovation: A resource-based view," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 229-238.
    5. Pu†yan Nie, 2018. "Comparing Horizontal Mergers Under Cournot with Bertrand Competitions," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 55-80, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information sharing; market size; R&D; merger and welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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