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Making the Politician and the Bureaucrat Deliver: Employment Guarantee in India

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  • Ashima Goyal

    ()

Abstract

The paper examines the division of tasks required between politicians and bureaucrats to run an effective rural employment guarantee scheme (EGS) in India, in the context of Indian history and habits.

Suggested Citation

  • Ashima Goyal, 2009. "Making the Politician and the Bureaucrat Deliver: Employment Guarantee in India," Working Papers id:1895, eSocialSciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:1895 Note: Institutional Papers
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tirole, J., 1993. "The Internal Organization of Government," Working papers 93-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    2. Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Working Papers 238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics,in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482 Elsevier.
    5. Hayami, Y & Platteau, J-P, 1997. "Resource Endowments and Agricultural Development : Africa vs. Asia," Papers 192, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
    6. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    7. Douglass C. North, 2005. "Introduction to Understanding the Process of Economic Change," Introductory Chapters,in: Understanding the Process of Economic Change Princeton University Press.
    8. North, D-C, 1997. "The Process of Economic Change," Research Paper 128, World Institute for Development Economics Research.
    9. Goyal, Ashima, 2003. "Budgetary processes: a political economy perspective," MPRA Paper 27786, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Barrett, Christopher B. & Holden, Stein & Clay, Daniel C., 2002. "Can Food-for-Work Programmes Reduce Vulnerability?," WIDER Working Paper Series 024, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    11. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    12. repec:hrv:faseco:30727607 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Politician; bureaucrat; incentives; employment guarantee; rural; India; Indian history; EGS; village management; resources; institution; democracy; African underdevelopment; panchayats; elected local councils;

    JEL classification:

    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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