Making politicians and bureaucrats deliver: decentralization and interlinked tasks
The paper analyzes incentive compatible task allocation between bureaucrats, central and local politicians in conjunction with the type of task. If effort in one task is an input in another task, giving the bureaucrat the second task as his objective will ensure the completion of both tasks. Compared to central politicians, lower level politicians may have more local power so decentralization requires a compensatory rise in local monitoring to make them more accountable to the public. Local monitoring is relatively easier, but even with it, local politicians put in less effort than local bureaucrats. Showing how the analysis can improve the provision of durable assets under the Mahatma Gandhi national rural employment guarantee scheme, and more generally improve the quality of public services, demonstrates its utility
|Date of creation:||01 Apr 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Indian Economic Journal 4.57(2010): pp. 3-19|
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