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French GPs’ willingness to delegate tasks: may financial incentives balance risk aversion?

Author

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  • Jean-Baptiste Simon Combes
  • Alain Paraponaris
  • Yann Videau

Abstract

Delegating tasks to paramedics is a fairly recent development in France. So far it has essentially been developed in hospitals and is incipient in general practice. This paper focuses on the willingness of general practitioner to do so. A 2012 survey of 2,000 GPs might help anticipate GPs' willingness to delegate. This paper tests whether a more favourable funding system might help increase GP willingness. We implement a quasi-experimental design wherein GPs are randomly selected to form three groups of equal size, each of them being exposed to a different funding scheme when declaring their willingness to delegate tasks to nurses: Fully Funded (FF) by the social security administration, self-funded by GPs' revenues (Self-Funded, SF) and half-funded by both the social security administration and GPs (Half-Funded, HF). GPs' likelihood to favour task delegation is estimated with a probit model that especially considers a GP's attitude towards risk (aversion or tolerance) among a set of covariates, such as age, gender, rural/urban area, GP density and funding scheme. This article shows that, first, GPs are more likely to favour delegation, when they share a lower proportion of the cost. Second, the effect of risk aversion on the likelihood of favouring delegation is not altered by the funding scheme.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Baptiste Simon Combes & Alain Paraponaris & Yann Videau, 2019. "French GPs’ willingness to delegate tasks: may financial incentives balance risk aversion?," Erudite Working Paper 2019-09, Erudite.
  • Handle: RePEc:eru:erudwp:wp19-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M55 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Contracting Devices

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