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The SD-prenucleolus for TU games

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  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier
  • Katsev, Ilya

Abstract

We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games. The new soluction is called SD-prenucleolus and is a lexicographic value although is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies several desirable poperties and is the only known solution that satisfies core stability, strong aggegate monotonicity and null player out property in the class of balanced games. The SD-prenucleolus is the only known solution that satisfies core stability continuity and is monotonic in the class of veto balanced games.

Suggested Citation

  • Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Katsev, Ilya, 2011. "The SD-prenucleolus for TU games," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:6230
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 2012. "Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(1), pages 208-213.
    2. Kleppe, J., 2010. "Modelling interactive behaviour, and solution concepts," Other publications TiSEM b9b96884-5761-48f0-9ee4-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. J. Arin & V. Feltkamp, 2005. "Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 13(2), pages 331-341, December.
    5. Peleg, B, 1987. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 16(4), pages 290-290.
    6. Vincent Feltkamp & Javier Arin, 1997. "The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(1), pages 61-73.
    7. Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter, 2007. "Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-72945-7, December.
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