Coalitional games with veto players: Consistency, monotonicity and Nash outcomes
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- Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Feltkamp, Vicent & Montero García, María, 2013. "Coalitional games with veto players: Myopic and farsighted behavior," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2013-73, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- J Arin & V Feltkamp & M Montero, 2012. "Coalitional Games with Veto Players: Myopic and Rational Behavior," Discussion Papers 2012-11, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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