Nonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus
A solution on a class of TU games that satisfies the axioms of the pre-nucleolus or -kernel except the equal treatment property and is single valued for two-person games, is a nonsymmetric pre-nucleolus (NSPN) or -kernel (NSPK). We investigate the NSPKs and NSPNs and their relations to the positive prekernel and to the positive core. It turns out that any NSPK is a subsolution of the positive prekernel. Moreover, we show that an arbitrary NSPK, when applied to a TU game, intersects the set of preimputations whose dissatisfactions coincide with the dissatisfactions of an arbitrary element of any other NSPK applied to this game. This result also provides a new proof of sufficiency of the characterizing conditions for NSPKs introduced by Orshan (Non-symmetric prekernels, discussion paper 60. Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1994 ). Any NSPN belongs to “its” NSPK. Several classes of NSPNs are presented, all of them being subsolutions of the positive core. We show that any NSPN is a subsolution of the positive core provided that it satisfies the equal treatment property on an infinite subset of the universe of potential players. Moreover, we prove that, for any game whose prenucleolus is in its anticore, any NSPN coincides with the prenucleolus. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter, 1998. "The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 292, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
- Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
- Guni Orshan & Peter Sudhölter, 2010.
"The positive core of a cooperative game,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 113-136, March.
- Peter Sudhölter & Yan-An Hwang, 2001. "Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 597-623.
- Orshan, Gooni, 1993. "The Prenucleolus and the Reduced Game Property: Equal Treatment Replaces Anonymity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 241-48.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:41:y:2012:i:4:p:809-828. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.