Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core
We characterize a monotonic core solution defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core solutions for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the per capita nucleolus is not monotonic.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Maniquet, F., 2000.
"A Characterization of the Shapley Value in Queueing Problems,"
222, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Maniquet, Francois, 2003. "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 90-103, March.
- MANIQUET, François, . "A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1662, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Muto, S. & Nakayama, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1988. "On big boss games," Other publications TiSEM 488a314a-179c-4628-91e6-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
- Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott, 1994. "Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 178-201, October.
- Lloyd S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 1964.
"Ownership and the Production Function,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
167, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Muto, Shigeo & Potters, Jos & Tijs, Stef, 1989. "Information Market Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 209-26.
- J. Arin & V. Feltkamp, 2005. "Monotonicity properties of the nucleolus on the domain of veto balanced games," TOP- An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 13(2), pages 331-341, December.
- Muto, S. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1989. "Information market games," Other publications TiSEM 2f3f1109-5579-4e6a-9482-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:216:y:2012:i:1:p:208-213. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.