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The problem with party finance : theoretical perspectives on the funding of party politics

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  • Hopkin, Jonathan

Abstract

This article presents some theoretical contours for the study of party finance and its consequences. Two broad issues are explored. First, the article develops an account of changes in patterns of party finance, and in particular the move away from the ‘mass party’ model of funding towards ‘elite party’ and ‘cartel party’ models. Party finance is conceptualized as a collective action problem, and four ‘post-mass party’ financial strategies are identified. Second, the article addresses normative issues, assessing how these four financial models perform in terms of ‘liberal’ and ‘populist’ theories of democracy. It is concluded that the mass party model remains closest to the ‘democratic’ ideal, whilst the state-financed (‘cartel’) model is a reasonable pragmatic response to the decline in party membership.

Suggested Citation

  • Hopkin, Jonathan, 2004. "The problem with party finance : theoretical perspectives on the funding of party politics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 646, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:646
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/646/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Albert Breton & Gianluigi Galeotti & Pierre Salmon & Ronald Wintrobe, 1997. "Understanding Democracy: Economic and Political Perspectives," Post-Print hal-00445586, HAL.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hopkin, Jonathan & Blyth, Mark, 2018. "The global economics of European populism: growth regimes and party system change in Europe (The Government and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Lecture 2017)," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100094, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Matthew Bond, 2007. "Elite Social Relations and Corporate Political Donations in Britain," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(1), pages 59-85, March.
    3. Poire, Alejandro, 2006. "Elements for a Theory of Political Finance," Working Paper Series rwp06-014, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. Nicole Bolleyer, 2009. "Inside the Cartel Party: Party Organisation in Government and Opposition," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 57(3), pages 559-579, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Funding; membership decline; party models; collective action; normative theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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