IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehl/lserod/24519.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The optimal design of funded pensions

Author

Listed:
  • Greco, Luciano G.

Abstract

In many countries, pension funds based on individual accounts have been affected by high operating costs. Contract theory helps to unravel the nature of such problems: managers of pension funds have strong incentives to manipulate market expectations about their capacity through wasteful activities (e.g. promotion). Thus, competition among pension funds entails efficiency loses, due to pension savings attraction efforts, as well as gains, related to investments in asset management skills. Regulations capping fees or costs of pension funds worsen market inefficiency, while a public pension fund competing with private ones improves (at least weekly) it. Taking into account political and commitment constraints affecting public institutions, a quasi-competitive pension scheme - centralizing contribution collection, auctioning the right to manage raised money to competitive fund managers, and affording an opting out choice to households -Pareto-dominates (at least weekly) the market of pension funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Greco, Luciano G., 2006. "The optimal design of funded pensions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24519, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:24519
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/24519/
    File Function: Open access version.
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Estelle James & Gary Ferrier & James H. Smalhout & Dimitri Vittas, 2000. "Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments: What Is the Most Efficient Way to Set Up Individual Accounts in a Social Security System?," NBER Chapters, in: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, pages 77-136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Andrea Prat, 2005. "The Wrong Kind of Transparency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 862-877, June.
    3. Eaton, Tim V. & Nofsinger, John R., 2004. "The effect of financial constraints and political pressure on the management of public pension plans," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 161-189.
    4. Besley, Timothy & Prat, Andrea, 2003. "Pension fund governance and the choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24853, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Oecd, 2005. "Global Pension Statistics Project: Data Update," Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2005(1), pages 191-194.
    6. Dobronogov, Anton & Murthi, Mamta, 2005. "Administrative fees and costs of mandatory private pensions in transition economies," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 31-55, March.
    7. Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sunden, 2002. "401(k)s And Company Stock: How Can We Encourage Diversification?," Issues in Brief ib-9, Center for Retirement Research.
    8. Diamond, Peter A., 2002. "Social Security Reform," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199247899.
    9. Srinivas, P.S. & Whitehouse, Edward & Yermo, Juan, 2000. "Regulating private pension funds'structure, performance, and investments : cross-country evidence," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 23302, The World Bank.
    10. Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2003. "The Gains from Pension Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 74-112, March.
    11. Tim Besley & Andrea Prat, 2005. "Credible pensions," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 26(1), pages 119-135, March.
    12. Bateman, Hazel & Mitchell, Olivia S., 2004. "New evidence on pension plan design and administrative expenses: the Australian experience," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 63-76, March.
    13. A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Public Economics," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 4, number 4.
    14. Atif Mian, 2008. "Incentives in Markets, Firms, and Governments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(2), pages 273-306, October.
    15. Martin Feldstein, 2005. "Structural Reform of Social Security," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 33-55, Spring.
    16. B. Douglas Bernheim & Lee S. Redding, 2001. "Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividends," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 463-507, December.
    17. Martin Feldstein, 2005. "Rethinking Social Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 1-24, March.
    18. Diamond Peter A & Orszag Peter R, 2005. "Saving Social Security: The Diamond-Orszag Plan," The Economists' Voice, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-9, April.
    19. Peter A. Diamond, 2000. "Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges with Individual Accounts," NBER Chapters, in: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, pages 137-172, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Peter Diamond, 2004. "Social Security," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 1-24, March.
    21. Missale, Alessandro, 1999. "Public Debt Management," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198290858.
    22. A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Public Economics," Handbook of Public Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    23. Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, 2005. "Saving Social Security," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 11-32, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Luciano Greco, 2005. "The Optimal Design of Funded Pension Plans: Unbundling Financing and Investment," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0003, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    2. Keuschnigg, Christian & Fisher, Walter, 2011. "Life-Cycle Unemployment, Retirement and Parametric Pension Reform," Economics Working Paper Series 1119, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    3. Walter Fisher & Christian Keuschnigg, 2010. "Pension reform and labor market incentives," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 23(2), pages 769-803, March.
    4. Christian Jaag & Christian Keuschnigg & Mirela Keuschnigg, 2010. "Pension reform, retirement, and life-cycle unemployment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(5), pages 556-585, October.
    5. Christian Keuschnigg & Mirela Keuschnigg & Christian Jaag, 2011. "Aging and the Financing of Social Security in Switzerland," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 147(II), pages 181-231, June.
    6. Libor Dusek, 2007. "Political Risk of Social Security: The Case of the Indexation of Benefits in the Czech Republic," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp318, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Impavido, Gregorio & Rocha, Roberto, 2006. "Competition and performance in the Hungarian second pillar," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3876, The World Bank.
    8. Andersen, Torben M. & Bhattacharya, Joydeep & Gestsson, Marias H., 2021. "Pareto-improving transition to fully funded pensions under myopia," Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(2), pages 169-212, June.
    9. Hans Fehr & Fabian Kindermann, 2010. "Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 56(3), pages 404-443, September.
    10. T. Scott Findley & Frank Caliendo, 2007. "OutSMarTing the Social Security Crisis," Public Finance Review, , vol. 35(6), pages 647-668, November.
    11. Kumru, Cagri S. & Thanopoulos, Athanasios C., 2011. "Social security reform with self-control preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 886-899, August.
    12. Louis Kaplow, 2010. "Targeted Savings and Labor Supply," NBER Working Papers 15656, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Nicholas Barr & Peter Diamond, 2006. "The Economics of Pensions," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 22(1), pages 15-39, Spring.
    14. Louis Kaplow, 2006. "Myopia and the Effects of Social Security and Capital Taxation on Labor Supply," NBER Working Papers 12452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. R. Melis & A. Trudda, 2014. "Mixed pension systems sustainability," Working Paper CRENoS 201413, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    16. Hans Fehr & Fabian Kindermann, 2010. "Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 56(3), pages 404-443, September.
    17. Louis Kaplow, 2011. "Targeted savings and labor supply," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(5), pages 507-518, October.
    18. Heikki Oksanen, 2005. "Actuarial Neutrality across Generations Applied to Public Pensions under Population Ageing: Effects on Government Finances and National Saving," CESifo Working Paper Series 1501, CESifo.
    19. Heer, Burkhard & Polito, Vito & Wickens, Michael R., 2020. "Population aging, social security and fiscal limits," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    20. Jean-Pierre Laffargue, 2009. "Intergenerational Transfers and the Stability of Public Debt with Short-Lived Governments," Mathematical Population Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 79-104.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    pension funds; signaling; public-private provision mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:24519. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: LSERO Manager (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lsepsuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.