One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of public and private pensions is key to making such promises credible. It argues that credibility concerns undermine the case for earnings-related pensions run by the state and private defined benefit plans.
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- Rabin, Matthew, 2002.
"A Perspective on Psychology and Economics,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt2wr3z049, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Rabin, Mathew, 2002. "A Perspective on Psychology and Economics," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4z78n1r9, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Matthew Rabin, 2003. "A Perspective on Psychology and Economics," General Economics and Teaching 0303003, EconWPA.
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