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Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments: What Is the Most Efficient Way to Set Up Individual Accounts in a Social Security System?

In: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Estelle James
  • Gary Ferrier
  • James H. Smalhout
  • Dimitri Vittas

Abstract

One of the biggest criticisms leveled at defined contribution individual account (IA) components of social security systems is that they are too expensive. This paper investigates the cost-effectiveness of three options for constructing funded social security pillars: 1) IA's invested in the retail market with relatively open choice, 2) IA's invested in the institutional market with constrained choice among investment companies, and 3) a centralized fund without individual accounts or differentiated investments across individuals. Our questions: What is the most cost-effective way to organize a mandatory IA system, how does the cost of an efficient IA system compare with that of a single centralized fund, and are the cost differentials large enough to outweigh the other important considerations? Our answers, based on empirical evidence about mutual and institutional funds in the U.S.: The retail market (option 1) allows individual investors to benefit from scale economies in asset management, but at the cost of high marketing expenses that are needed to attract and aggregate small sums of money into large pools. In contrast, a centralized fund (option 3) can be much cheaper because it achieves scale economies without high marketing costs, but gives workers no choice and hence is subject to political manipulation and misallocation of capital. Mandatory IA systems can be structured to get the best of both worlds: to obtain scale economies in asset management without incurring high marketing costs or sacrificing worker choice. To accomplish this requires centralized collections, a modest level of investor service and constrained choice. The system of constrained choice described in this paper (option 2) is much cheaper than the retail market and only slightly more expensive than a single centralized fund. We estimate that it will cost only .14-.18% of assets annually. These large administrative cost savings imply a Pareto improvement so long as choice is not constraine
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Suggested Citation

  • Estelle James & Gary Ferrier & James H. Smalhout & Dimitri Vittas, 2000. "Mutual Funds and Institutional Investments: What Is the Most Efficient Way to Set Up Individual Accounts in a Social Security System?," NBER Chapters, in: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, pages 77-136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7469
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    Cited by:

    1. Whitehouse, Edward, 2000. "Paying for pensions: An international comparison of administrative charges in funded retirement-income systems," MPRA Paper 14171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. James E. Pesando, 2001. "The Canada Pension Plan: Looking Back at the Recent Reforms," The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, in: Patrick Grady & Andrew Sharpe (ed.),The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, pages 137-150, Centre for the Study of Living Standards.
    3. Luciano Greco, 2005. "The Optimal Design of Funded Pension Plans: Unbundling Financing and Investment," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0003, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    4. Mr. Rene Weber & David S. Gerber, 2007. "Aging, Asset Allocation, and Costs: Evidence for the Pension Fund Industry in Switzerland," IMF Working Papers 2007/029, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Greco, Luciano G., 2006. "The optimal design of funded pensions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24519, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Mathur, Ike & ap Gwilym, Rhys, 2014. "Integrating corporate ownership and pension fund structures: A general equilibrium approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 553-569.
    7. Estelle James & Alejandra Cox Edwards & Rebeca Wong, 2012. "The Gender Impact of Pension Reform," World Bank Publications - Reports 13046, The World Bank Group.
    8. Whitehouse, Edward, 2000. "Administrative charges for funded pensions : an international comparison and assessment," Social Protection Discussion Papers and Notes 23140, The World Bank.
    9. James,Estelle & Smalhout, James & Vittas, Dimitri, 2001. "Administrative costs and the organization of individual retirement account systems : a comparative perspective," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2554, The World Bank.
    10. James, Estelle & Edwards, Alejandra Cox & Wong, Rebecca, 2003. "The gender impact of pension reform : a cross-country analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3074, The World Bank.

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