The effect of financial constraints and political pressure on the management of public pension plans
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- Luciano Greco, 2005. "The Optimal Design of Funded Pension Plans: Unbundling Financing and Investment," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0003, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- repec:bla:pbudge:v:37:y:2017:i:1:p:68-87 is not listed on IDEAS
- Mohan, Nancy & Zhang, Ting, 2014. "An analysis of risk-taking behavior for public defined benefit pension plans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 403-419.
- repec:spr:ecogov:v:19:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10101-018-0201-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Tim V. Eaton & John R. Nofsinger & Abhishek Varma, 2014. "Institutional Investor Ownership and Corporate Pension Transparency," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 43(3), pages 603-630, September.
- Greco, Luciano G., 2006. "The optimal design of funded pensions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24519, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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