IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/7470.html

Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges with Individual Accounts

In: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform

Author

Listed:
  • Peter A. Diamond

Abstract

There are many individual account proposals. For government-organized accounts, the government arranges for both record-keeping and investment management. For privately-organized accounts, individuals directly select private firms to do these tasks. The government spreads the costs of government-organized accounts among accounts, outside sources of revenue, employers and workers. With privately-organized accounts, equilibrium prices reflect selling costs as well as administrative costs. Thus, government-organized accounts are organized on a group basis while privately-organized accounts are organized on an individual basis. In financial and insurance markets generally, the group and individual markets function very differently and yield different pricing structures. The paper describes a low cost/low services government-organized plan and estimates that it might cost $40-50 per worker per year. The nature of equilibrium with privately-organized accounts is discussed, with the conclusion that the costs would be very high compared to the cost of government organization.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Peter A. Diamond, 2000. "Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges with Individual Accounts," NBER Chapters, in: Administrative Aspects of Investment-Based Social Security Reform, pages 137-172, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7470
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7470.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peter Diamond, 2006. "Reforming Public Pensions in the US and the UK," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(509), pages 94-118, February.
    2. Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, 2005. "Saving Social Security," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 11-32, Spring.
    3. Youngse Mun & Inho Mun, 2012. "Privatizing the Social Security Program in the U.S.: How to Overcome the Transition Costs," International Review of Public Administration, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(2), pages 39-62, August.
    4. Chavez-Bedoya, Luis & Castaneda, Ranu, 2021. "A benchmarking approach to track and compare administrative charges on flow and balance in individual account pension systems," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 7-23.
    5. Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2003. "The Gains from Pension Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 74-112, March.
    6. Peeters, Marga, 2011. "“Better Safe than Sorry” - Individual Risk-free Pension Schemes in the European Union - Macroeconomic Benefits, the Mobile Working Citizen’s Perspective and Why Nots," MPRA Paper 33571, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Pecchenino, R.A. & Pollard, P.S., 1999. "Government Mandated Private Pensions: A Dependable Foundation for Retirement Security?," Papers 9902, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory.
    8. Blerina Mucaj, 2006. "Efficiency of Pension Funds Management in OECD Countries: Registered Retirement Savings Plan in Canada," Development Discussion Papers 2006-05, JDI Executive Programs.
    9. Martin Feldstein, 2009. "Reducing the Risk of Investment-Based Social Security Reform," NBER Chapters, in: Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment, pages 201-218, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Antón Pérez, José Ignacio, 2006. "The Reform of the Pension Systems in Easterm Europe and these Impact about the Efficiency and Equity/La reforma de los sistemas de pensiones en Europa del Este y su impacto sobre la eficiencia y la eq," Estudios de Economia Aplicada, Estudios de Economia Aplicada, vol. 24, pages 643(20á)-64, Agosto.
    11. Mr. Rene Weber & David S. Gerber, 2007. "Aging, Asset Allocation, and Costs: Evidence for the Pension Fund Industry in Switzerland," IMF Working Papers 2007/029, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Galasso, Vincenzo & D'Amato, Marcello, 2002. "Aggregate Risk, Political Constraints and Social Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3330, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Greco, Luciano G., 2006. "The optimal design of funded pensions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24519, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Ebrahim, M. Shahid & Mathur, Ike & ap Gwilym, Rhys, 2014. "Integrating corporate ownership and pension fund structures: A general equilibrium approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 553-569.
    15. Ronald Fischer & Pablo González & Pablo Serra, 2003. "The Privatization of Social Services in Chile: an Evaluation," Documentos de Trabajo 167, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    16. Alan Siu, 2002. "Hong Kong's Mandatory Provident Fund," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 22(2), pages 317-332, Fall.
    17. Libor Dusek, 2007. "Political Risk of Social Security: The Case of the Indexation of Benefits in the Czech Republic," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp318, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    18. Luis Chávez-Bedoya & Nelson Ramírez-Rondán, 2014. "Comparando Comisiones por Flujo y Saldo en Fondos de Pensiones con Cuentas Individuales de Capitalización," Working Papers 9, Peruvian Economic Association.
    19. Solange Berstein & Alejandro Micco, 2002. "Turnover and Regulation: The Chilean Pension Fund Industry," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 180, Central Bank of Chile.
    20. Impavido, Gregorio & Rocha, Roberto, 2006. "Competition and performance in the Hungarian second pillar," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3876, The World Bank.
    21. Douglas W. Elmendorf & Jeffrey B. Liebman & David W. Wilcox, 2001. "Fiscal Policy and Social Security Policy During the 1990s," NBER Working Papers 8488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Feldstein, Martin & Liebman, Jeffrey B., 2002. "Social security," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 32, pages 2245-2324, Elsevier.
    23. Dummann, Kathrin, 2008. "Retirement saving and attitude towards financial intermediaries: Evidence for Germany," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 99, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7470. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.