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Mercantilist institutions for the pursuit of power with profit. The management of Britain’s national debt, 1756-1815

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  • O'Brien, Patrick

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  • O'Brien, Patrick, 2006. "Mercantilist institutions for the pursuit of power with profit. The management of Britain’s national debt, 1756-1815," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 22322, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:22322
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22322/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leonard Gomes, 1987. "Foreign Trade and the National Economy," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-08992-5, December.
    2. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
    3. Ashworth, William J., 2003. "Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, and Consumption in England 1640-1845," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199259212, Decembrie.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N0 - Economic History - - General
    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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