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Span of control and span of activity

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  • Bandiera, Oriana
  • Prat, Andrea
  • Sadun, Raffaella
  • Wulf, Julie

Abstract

For both practitioners and researchers, span of control plays an important role in defining and understanding the role of the CEO. In this paper, we combine organizational chart information for a sample of 65 companies with detailed data on how their CEOs allocate their work time, which we define as their span of activity. Span of activity provides a direct measure of the CEO’s management style, including the attention devoted to specific subordinates and functions, the time devoted to individual work and outside constituencies, a preference for multilateral or bilateral interaction, the degree of planning, etc. We find that CEOs with a larger number of reports spend more time with subordinates, more time on large meetings, less time on unplanned activities. The presence of a delegate, such as the COO, allows the CEO to reduce the time spent with insiders and to focus on bilateral and unplanned activities. These results suggest that time-use information is helpful in interpreting how span of control determines management style.

Suggested Citation

  • Bandiera, Oriana & Prat, Andrea & Sadun, Raffaella & Wulf, Julie, 2012. "Span of control and span of activity," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121772, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:121772
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2011. "What Do CEOs Do?," EIEF Working Papers Series 1101, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Oct 2010.
    2. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2015. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 623-681.
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    Cited by:

    1. McCann, Robert J. & Shi, Xianwen & Siow, Aloysius & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2012. "Becker Meets Ricardo: Multisector Matching with Social and Cognitive Skills," IZA Discussion Papers 6533, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Paola Rovelli & Cristina Rossi-Lamastra, 2018. "Collecting data on TMTs’ organizational design: good practices from the StiMa project," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 45(2), pages 175-213, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    management; firms; CEO; productivity; firm activities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions; Probabilities
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

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