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Effects of the 2004 Personal Income Tax System Reform on the Shadow Sector in Ukraine

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  • Koziarivska Larysa
  • Oliinyk Andrii

Abstract

The paper researches into the consequences of the pit reform of 2004 introduced on tax revenues, shadow activities, and income streams. The research approach adopted involves constructing theoretical general equilibrium model adapted to Ukrainian practices and further empirical testing of the hypotheses on the firm-level data. The study leads to inferring that the reform did not stimulate any tangible structural changes in the economy; with no effect on the shadow sector size. As a result of the reform, the government's income in the form of PIT revenues was redistributed to firms. The research shows that under the present conditions no other rate is expected to perform better the existing rate. Within the framework of existing structural ties in the economy it would be beneficial to increase compliance by introducing a more severe punishment for evasion.

Suggested Citation

  • Koziarivska Larysa & Oliinyk Andrii, 2006. "Effects of the 2004 Personal Income Tax System Reform on the Shadow Sector in Ukraine," EERC Working Paper Series 06-08e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    • Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:06-08e
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ukraine; tax reform; tax policy; tax evasion; shadow economy; behavioural response;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • E64 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Incomes Policy; Price Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm

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