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Minimum wage and tax evasion: theory

  • Tonin, Mirco

The paper builds a theoretical model to analyse the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labour. The firm and the worker agree on the amount of earnings to report to the fiscal authorities, which possess an imperfect detection technology. The introduction of the minimum wage poses a constraint on the reporting decision and induces an increase in compliance by some agents. As a consequence, a spike at the minimum wage appears in the distribution of declared earnings. Moreover, a nominally neutral fiscal regime becomes regressive, while fiscal revenues may increase. Keywords; minimum wage, tax evasion

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Paper provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton in its series Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics with number 0711.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:stn:sotoec:0711
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  1. Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Nielsen, Søren Bo, 2007. "Under-reporting of income and Labour Market Performance," Working Papers 10-2007, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
  2. Naomi E. Feldman & Joel Slemrod, 2007. "Estimating tax noncompliance with evidence from unaudited tax returns," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 327-352, 03.
  3. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier.
  4. Alm, James & Bahl, Roy & Murray, Matthew N, 1990. "Tax Structure and Tax Compliance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 72(4), pages 603-13, November.
  5. Mirko Draca & Stephen Machin & John Van Reenen, 2006. "Minimum wages and firm profitability," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 774, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Kosali Ilayperuma Simon & Robert Kaestner, 2004. "Do minimum wages affect non-wage job attributes? Evidence on fringe benefits," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 58(1), pages 52-70, October.
  7. Nidardo, J. & Fortin, N. & Lemieux, T., 1994. "Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach," Papers 93-94-15, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  8. repec:att:wimass:9610 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Loayza, Norman V., 1996. "The economics of the informal sector: a simple model and some empirical evidence from Latin America," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 129-162, December.
  10. Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, 2006. "Shadow Sorting," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 10, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    • Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, 2005. "Shadow Sorting," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2005, pages 125-163 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  12. Cowell, Frank A., 1985. "Tax evasion with labour income," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 19-34, February.
  13. Fugazza, Marco & Jacques, Jean-Francois, 2004. "Labor market institutions, taxation and the underground economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1-2), pages 395-418, January.
  14. Sandmo, Agnar, 1981. "Income tax evasion, labour supply, and the equity--efficiency tradeoff," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 265-288, December.
  15. Dickens, Richard & Alan Manning, 2003. "The Impact of the National Minimum Wage on the Wage Distribution in a Low-Wage Sector," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 60, Royal Economic Society.
  16. Brown, Charles, 1999. "Minimum wages, employment, and the distribution of income," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 32, pages 2101-2163 Elsevier.
  17. Erard, Brian, 1997. "Self-selection with measurement errors A microeconometric analysis of the decision to seek tax assistance and its implications for tax compliance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 319-356, December.
  18. Acemoglu, Daron, 2001. "Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, January.
  19. Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
  20. Klepper, Steven & Nagin, Daniel, 1989. "The Anatomy of Tax Evasion," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-24, Spring.
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