Cheap Talk is not Cheap: Free versus Costly Communication
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- Aghadadashli, Hamid & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Legros, Patrick, 2021. "Cheap Talk is not Cheap: Free versus Costly Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 15843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Crawford, Vincent, 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 286-298, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
credible communication; asymmetric information; coordination;
All these keywords.JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2021-03-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2021-03-01 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2021-03-01 (Microeconomics)
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