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Alliance contractual design

  • Ariño, Africa

    ()

    (IESE Business School)

  • Reuer, Jeffrey J.

    (University of North Carolina)

Registered author(s):

    Our purpose in this paper is to provide an overview of what we know about alliance contracts. After a short introduction to the contents of alliance contracts, we start by contrasting alliance contractual form and governance form. Next, we focus on two related constructs: contractual complexity and contractual completeness. We suggest that contractual complexity is a more adequate construct to investigate in the absence of information about the transaction contemplated in the contract. After that, we present the measures of contractual complexity used in past studies. Then, we go over the determinants of contractual complexity by considering their influence on contracting costs and benefits given environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Conclusions and suggestions for research are offered at the end.

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    File URL: http://www.iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0572-E.pdf
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    Paper provided by IESE Business School in its series IESE Research Papers with number D/572.

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    Length: 23 pages
    Date of creation: 29 Sep 2004
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0572
    Contact details of provider: Postal: IESE Business School, Av Pearson 21, 08034 Barcelona, SPAIN
    Web page: http://www.iese.edu/

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    1. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    2. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-175839 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Nöldeke, Georg & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1995. "Option contracts and renegotiation: A solution to the Hold-Up Problem," Munich Reprints in Economics 19329, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    4. Lee G. Branstetter & Mariko Sakakibara, 2002. "When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from Japanese Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 143-159, March.
    5. Telser, L G, 1980. "A Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 27-44, January.
    6. Harvey S. James Jr, 2000. "Separating contract from governance," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(2), pages 47-61.
    7. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
    8. Wernerfelt, Birger, 2003. "Governance of Adjustments," Working papers 4412-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
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