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Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model




If a dollar denominated external debt comes with so many risks, why do emerging economies allow for such an imbalance to accumulate ? The explanation provided in this paper builds on a simple signaling model. By assumption, lenders have no direct possibility to infer a firm’s financial stance. Therefore sound firms might want to borrow dollars and bear a high clearance cost, just in order to signal their type. The success of this policy depends on the behavior of bad firms. When dollar borrowing clearance costs are relatively small with respect to the clearance cost of borrowing in the local currency, the whole private sector would opt for liability dollarization. In this case the signaling effect vanishes, while all firms bear high clearance costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2004. "Excessive Liability Dollarization in a Simple Signaling Model," ESSEC Working Papers DR 04001, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-04001

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Guillermo A. Calvo & Carmen M. Reinhart, 2002. "Fear of Floating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(2), pages 379-408.
    2. Besancenot, Damien & Vranceanu, Radu, 2003. "Financial Instability under Floating Exchange Rates," ESSEC Working Papers DR 03011, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Bacchetta, Philippe & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2001. "Currency crises and monetary policy in an economy with credit constraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(7), pages 1121-1150.
    4. Ize, Alain & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Financial dollarization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 323-347, March.
    5. repec:rus:hseeco:123906 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 21-42, Fall.
    7. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, 2014. "Addicted to Dollars," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(1), pages 1-50, May.
    8. Jeanne, Olivier, 2000. "Foreign currency debt and the global financial architecture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 719-727, May.
    9. Jeronimo Zettelmeyer & Olivier D Jeanne, 2002. "“Original Sin,” Balance Sheet Crises, and the Roles of International Lending," IMF Working Papers 02/234, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Paul R. Krugman, 2000. "Crises : the price of globalization?," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 75-106.
    11. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann, 1999. "Exchange rates and financial fragility," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 329-368.
    12. Cowan, kevin & Quy-Toan Do, 2003. "Financial dollarization and central bank credibility," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3082, The World Bank.
    13. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    14. Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, 2000. "Dollarization of Liabilities: Underinsurance and Domestic Financial Underdevelopment," NBER Working Papers 7792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brown, M. & Ongena, S. & Yesin, P., 2008. "Currency Denomination of Bank Loans : Evidence from Small Firms in Transition Countries," Discussion Paper 2008-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Brown, Martin & Ongena, Steven & Yesin, Pinar, 2009. "Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 7540, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item


    Original sin; Signaling; Developing countries; Liability dollarization; Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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