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Unconditionally Optimal Ramsey policy

Author

Listed:
  • Tatiana Damjanovic

    () (Durham University, Durham University Business School)

  • Vladislav Damjanovic

    () (Durham University, Durham University Business School)

  • Charles Nolan

    () (Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow)

Abstract

We discuss a time invariant policy which delivers the unconditionally optimal outcomes in purely forward-looking models and Ramsey outcomes in purely backward-looking models. This policy is a product of interaction between two institutions with distinct responsibilities. Motivated by Brendon and Ellison (2015), we think of them as arms of government. One institution is responsible for ëforward guidanceí, setting rules which are necessary and su¢ cient to determine private expectations. The second institution implements optimal policy taking expectations as given. The forward guidance rules are designed to maximise the unconditional expectation of the social objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2017. "Unconditionally Optimal Ramsey policy," CEGAP Working Papers 2017_01, Durham University Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:dur:cegapw:2017_01
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tatiana Damjanovic & Vladislav Damjanovic & Charles Nolan, 2015. "Ordering Policy Rules with an Unconditional Welfare Measure," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(1), pages 103-149, January.
    2. Christian Jensen & Bennett T. Mccallum, 2010. "Optimal Continuation versus the Timeless Perspective in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(6), pages 1093-1107, September.
    3. Julio J. Rotemberg & Michael Woodford, 1998. "An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy: Expanded Version," NBER Technical Working Papers 0233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Blake, Andrew P. & Kirsanova, Tatiana, 2004. "A note on timeless perspective policy design," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 9-16, October.
    5. Damjanovic, Tatiana & Damjanovic, Vladislav & Nolan, Charles, 2008. "Unconditionally optimal monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 491-500, April.
    6. Whiteman, Charles H, 1986. "An Analytical Policy Design under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1387-1405, November.
    7. Benigno, Pierpaolo & Woodford, Michael, 2012. "Linear-quadratic approximation of optimal policy problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 1-42.
    8. McCallum, Bennett-T, 2005. "What Is the Proper Perspective for Monetary Policy Optimality?," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 23(S1), pages 13-24, October.
    9. Lars E.O. Svensson, 2014. "Forward Guidance," NBER Working Papers 20796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Kollmann, Robert, 2002. "Monetary policy rules in the open economy: effects on welfare and business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 989-1015, July.
    11. Taylor, John B, 1979. "Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic Model with Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1267-1286, September.
    12. Horvath Michal, 2011. "Alternative Perspectives on Optimal Public Debt Adjustment," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-22, November.
    13. Martin Ellison & Charles Brendon, 2015. "Time-Consistent Institutional Design," 2015 Meeting Papers 495, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Time inconsistency; forward guidance; unconditional optimisation; Ramsey optimal policy.;

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers

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