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Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands

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  • Julie Tréguier
  • Simon Rabaté

Abstract

This paper investigates the impact of survivors insurance on marital behavior. We study the 1996 Dutch reform which considerably tightened eligibility rules to survivors' benefits. Exploiting a discontinuity in date of birth eligibility to survivors insurance and using a rich and exhaustive Dutch population administrative dataset, we carry out a regression discontinuity design and we find no evidence of the reform on divorce probability. Exploring possible explanations for our zero-effect result, we study how labor supply responses can compensate the income drop the reform induced. We find a strong increase in the labor force participation of widows after the reform. However this response does not completely offset the decrease in income generated form the cut in survivors benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," EconomiX Working Papers 2021-16, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2021-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    divorce; marriage dissolution; survivor benefits; labor supply; income effect; unearned income;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy

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