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The Married Widow: Marriage Penalties Matter!

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Baker

    (University of Toronto and NBER)

  • Emily Hanna

    (University of Toronto)

  • Jasmin Kantarevic

    (University of Toronto)

Abstract

Marriage penalties are a controversial feature of many government policies. Empirical evidence of their behavioral effects is quite mixed, which is surprising because economic theory predicts that they should have an impact on the headship decision. We investigate the removal of marriage penalties from the surviving spouse pensions of the Canadian public pension system in the 1980s. These reforms provide a simple and transparent source of identification. Our results indicate that marriage penalties can have large and persistent effects on marriage decisions. We also present evidence suggesting that it is individuals with characteristics correlated with greater wealth who respond to the penalties. (JEL: J1, H2) Copyright (c) 2004 The European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Baker & Emily Hanna & Jasmin Kantarevic, 2004. "The Married Widow: Marriage Penalties Matter!," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(4), pages 634-664, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:2:y:2004:i:4:p:634-664
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Josefine Koebe & Jan Marcus, 2020. "The Impact of the Length of Schooling on the Timing of Family Formation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1896, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Nadia Myohl, 2024. "Till taxes keep us apart? The impact of the marriage tax on the marriage rate," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(2), pages 552-592, April.
    3. Marcus, Jan, 2022. "The Length of Schooling and the Timing of Family Formation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 68(1), pages 1-45.
    4. Julie Tréguier & Simon Rabaté, 2021. "Survivors Benefits and Conjugal Behavior. Evidence from the Netherlands," Working Papers hal-04159749, HAL.
    5. Martin Halla, 2009. "The Effect of Joint Custody on Marriage and Divorce," Economics working papers 2009-09, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    6. Nadia Myohl, 2022. "Till Taxes Keep Us Apart? The Impact of the Marriage Tax on the Marriage Rate," CESifo Working Paper Series 9747, CESifo.
    7. Milligan, Kevin & Schirle, Tammy, 2013. "The Retirement Income System and the Risks Faced by Canadian Seniors," CLSSRN working papers clsrn_admin-2013-27, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 29 Apr 2013.
    8. Jiang Li & Benoit Dostie & Gaëlle Simard-Duplain, 2023. "Firm Pay Policies and the Gender Earnings Gap: The Mediating Role of Marital and Family Status," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 76(1), pages 160-188, January.
    9. Ruobing Liang & Xiaobing Wang & Futoshi Yamauchi, 2021. "Cotton Revolution and Widow Chastity in Ming and Qing China," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(1), pages 232-252, January.
    10. Isaac Ehrlich & Jinyoung Kim, 2007. "Social Security and Demographic Trends: Theory and Evidence from the International Experience," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(1), pages 55-77, January.
    11. Petra Persson, 2020. "Social Insurance and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(1), pages 252-300.
    12. Gordon Dahl & Katrine Loken, 2024. "Families, Public Policies, and the Labor Market," RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series 2423, ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin).
    13. Isaac Ehrlich & Jinyoung Kim, 2005. "Social Security, Demographic Trends, and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence from the International Experience," NBER Working Papers 11121, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Michał Myck & Monika Oczkowska, 2021. "Widows’ Time, Time Stress and Happiness: Adjusting to Loss," NBER Working Papers 28752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Dahl, Gordon & Loken, Katrine V., 2024. "Families, public policies, and the labor market," Handbook of Labor Economics,, Elsevier.
    16. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysius Siow, 2008. "Marriage matching, risk sharing and spousal labor supplies," Working Papers tecipa-332, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    17. Wolfgang Frimmel & Martin Halla & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2014. "Can Pro-Marriage Policies Work? An Analysis of Marginal Marriages," Demography, Springer;Population Association of America (PAA), vol. 51(4), pages 1357-1379, August.
    18. Carole Bonnet & Fanny Godet & Anne Solaz, 2019. "Gendered economic determinants of couple formation over 50 in France," Working Papers G2019/13, French Institute for Demographic Studies.
    19. Salisbury, Laura, 2017. "Women's Income and Marriage Markets in the United States: Evidence from the Civil War Pension," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 1-38, March.
    20. Fink, Alexander, 2016. "Income taxation and the timing of marriage," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145827, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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