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Wettbewerb aller Krankenversicherungen kann Qualität verbessern und Kosten des Gesundheitswesens senken

Author

Listed:
  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Birgit Edener
  • Markus Grabka
  • Klaus-Dirk Henke
  • Monika Huber
  • Hermann Ribhegge
  • Andreas Ryll
  • Hans-Jürgen Wagener
  • Gert G. Wagner

Abstract

A draft of a reform towards "socially bounded competition" within the health care system indicates, first of all, that several areas of such an insurance system would have to be regulated by the state. Such a reform is much more complicated than text book models or the proposals of various expert groups imply. Secondly, the necessary regulation is multifaceted and heavenly influenced by value judgements. It therefore cannot be solved by a theoretical discussion alone. If one wishes to implement increased competition in the health insurance system of Germany (or somewhere else), detailed analyses are needed and political decisions have to be made. Das präsentierte und diskutierte Modell eines sozialgebundenen Krankenversicherungswettbewerbs zeigt zum Ersten, dass ein derartiges System an vielen Stellen vom Staat reguliert werden muss. Es ist deutlich komplizierter als die bislang in der Diskussion befindlichen Lehrbuchmodelle und die Reformvorschläge, die lediglich einem Agenda Setting dienen und notwendigerweise nur Prinzipien postulieren. Zum Zweiten zeigt sich, dass die Regulierungsnotwendigkeiten derart vielfältig und letztlich von Werturteilen abhängig sind, so dass eine Reform nicht allein aus einer medizinischen oder wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Rationalität heraus gestaltet werden kann. Insofern ist auch unser Vorschlag noch in hohem Maße diskussions- und damit ergänzungsbedürftig.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolfgang Buchholz & Birgit Edener & Markus Grabka & Klaus-Dirk Henke & Monika Huber & Hermann Ribhegge & Andreas Ryll & Hans-Jürgen Wagener & Gert G. Wagner, 2001. "Wettbewerb aller Krankenversicherungen kann Qualität verbessern und Kosten des Gesundheitswesens senken," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 247, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp247
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    14. Friedrich Breyer & Volker Ulrich, 2000. "Demographischer Wandel, medizinischer Fortschritt und Anstieg der Gesundheitsausgaben," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 67(24), pages 374-379.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Greß & Ralf Kocher & Jürgen Wasem, 2004. "Wettbewerbsorientierte Reformen im Gesundheitssystem der Schweiz – Vorbild für regulierten Wettbewerb in der deutschen GKV?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(1), pages 59-70, February.
    2. repec:ces:ifodic:v:1:y:2003:i:3:p:14567906 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Markus M. Grabka & Hanfried H. Andersen & Klaus-Dirk Henke & Katja Borchardt, 2002. "Kapitaldeckung in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung: zur Berechnung der finanziellen Auswirkungen eines Umstiegs vom Umlage auf das Kapitaldeckungssystem," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 275, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Klaus-Dirk Henke & Katja Borchardt, 2003. "Capital Funding versus Pay-as-you-go in Health-care Financing Reconsidered," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 1(3), pages 03-08, October.
    5. Mathias Kifmann, 2002. "Die Finanzierung der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung durch Kopfbeiträge aus verfassungsökonomischer Sicht," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(4), pages 505-512.
    6. Dieterich, Felix, 2005. "Risikoselektion und Risikoausgleich am Beispiel der gesetzlichen Krankenkassen in Deutschland," Discussion Papers in Economics 718, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    7. Borchardt, Katja & Farhauer, Oliver, 2003. "Kapitaldeckung als Antwort auf die demographische Herausforderung?," Discussion Papers 2003/6, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Klaus-Dirk Henke & Katja Borchardt, 2003. "Capital Funding versus Pay-as-you-go in Health-care Financing Reconsidered," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 1(03), pages 03-08, October.
    9. Göpffarth Dirk & Henke Klaus-Dirk, 2007. "Finanzierungsreform und Risikostrukturausgleich – Was bleibt vom Ausgleichsverfahren? / Health Care Finance Reform in Germany – Effects on the Risk Adjustment Scheme," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 227(1), pages 27-48, February.
    10. repec:jns:jbstat:v:227:y:2007:i:1:p:27-48 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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