Wettbewerbsorientierte Reformen im Gesundheitssystem der Schweiz - Vorbild für regulierten Wettbewerb in der deutschen GKV?
Recent reforms of the Swiss health care system to introduce regulated competition have raised expectations about the possible combination of more efficient services, while at same time maintaining or even increasing the level of solidarity in health care systems. In this article we examine expected behavioral changes of the market actors, the way incentives for market actors have been changed and analyze the way market actors in fact changed their behavior. We conclude that so far only some of the targets of the reforms have been met. For a reasonable assessment of the Swiss experience in regulating competition in health care it is paramount to distinguish expected effects from actual effects. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2004
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Volume (Year): 5 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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- Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459 Elsevier.
- Wolfgang Buchholz & Birgit Edener & Markus Grabka & Klaus-Dirk Henke & Monika Huber & Hermann Ribhegge & Andreas Ryll & Hans-Jürgen Wagener & Gert G. Wagner, 2001. "Wettbewerb aller Krankenversicherungen kann Qualität verbessern und Kosten des Gesundheitswesens senken," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 247, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Wasem, Jürgen & Greß, Stefan & Rothgang, Heinz, 2003. "Kopfprämien in der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung: Eine Perspektive für die Zukunft?," Working papers of the ZeS 07/2003, University of Bremen, Centre for Social Policy Research (ZeS).
- Andreas Werblow, 2002. "Alles nur Selektion?: Der Einfluss von Selbstbehalten in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(4), pages 427-436.
- Mathias Kifmann, 1999. "Community rating and choice between traditional health insurance and managed care," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(7), pages 563-578.
- Van de ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Ellis, Randall P., 2000. "Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 755-845 Elsevier.
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