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Employees Equity Issue and Asymmetric Information:Evidence from France - Augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés et Asymétrie d’information:Cas de la France

  • Djaoudath Alidou

    ()

    (Groupe ESC Troyes - Université de Bourgogne (LEG))

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    (VA)This study explores determinants of employees’ equity issues of French companies. Based on the predictions of the pecking order theory, we test whether asymmetric information influences a company’s decision to issue new shares reserved for employees. The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the factors that matter in employees’ equity issue decision on French context. We develop a logit model on a sample of 110 non financial companies that belong to SBF250 index over the period 1998-2007. Our results show that when asymmetric information is measured by the number of financial analysts and the intangibility of assets, there is a positive effect on the decision to issue equity to employees. This result is consistent with previous studies. Furthermore, our research confirms that the level of financing deficit has a positive influence on the employees’ equity issues decision. This finding allows to confirm the predictions of pecking order theory.(VF)L’objectif de cet article est d’identifier les déterminants de la décision des entreprises de recourir à une augmentation de capital réservée aux salariés. En se basant sur les prédictions de la théorie du financement hiérarchique, nous vérifions si le niveau d’asymétrie d’information a une influence sur la décision d’émettre des actions réservées aux salariés. A partir d’un échantillon de 110 entreprises non financières françaises appartenant au SBF250 de 1998 à 2007, un modèle logit est développé afin d’examiner les facteurs qui influencent cette décision de financement. Les résultats montrent qu’il y a un effet positif statistiquement significatif de l’asymétrie d’information sur la décision d’émettre des actions réservées aux salariés, lorsque cette asymétrie d’information est mesurée par le nombre d’analystes financiers et l’intangibilité de l’actif. De même, le niveau du déficit de financement a un effet positif sur la décision de mettre en place une augmentation de capital réservée aux salariés. Les résultats obtenus confirment ainsi les prédictions de la théorie du financement hiérarchique.

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    Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations in its series Working Papers CREGO with number 1120901.

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    Length: 19 pages
    Date of creation: Sep 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1120901
    Contact details of provider: Postal: 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

    Order Information: Postal: Angèle Renaud, CREGO, 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France
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    14. Seifert, Bruce & Gonenc, Halit, 2008. "The international evidence on the pecking order hypothesis," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 244-260, July.
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