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How do firms finance their investments?: The relative importance of equity issuance and debt contracting costs

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  • Gatchev, Vladimir A.
  • Spindt, Paul A.
  • Tarhan, Vefa

Abstract

This paper examines the financing decisions of firms in response to changes in investments and profits. We find that information frictions play important roles in firms' financing decisions. However, we find no evidence that asymmetric information about the value of a firm's assets causes equity to be used only as a last resort. Indeed equity is the predominant source of finance in situations, such as profit shortfalls, investment in intangible assets, and internally generated growth opportunities, where informational asymmetries and agency costs are likely to be high. We also find that firms respond asymmetrically to positive and negative profit shocks. In financing fixed assets, high asymmetric information firms use more short-term debt and less long-term debt, whereas firms with high potential agency problems use significantly more equity and less long-term debt and cash.

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  • Gatchev, Vladimir A. & Spindt, Paul A. & Tarhan, Vefa, 2009. "How do firms finance their investments?: The relative importance of equity issuance and debt contracting costs," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 179-195, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:15:y:2009:i:2:p:179-195
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Didier Brandao,Tatiana & Levine,Ross Eric & Schmukler,Sergio L., 2015. "Capital market financing, firm growth, and firm size distribution," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7353, The World Bank.
    3. repec:kap:jbuset:v:144:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10551-015-2856-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Mufaddal Baxamusa & Sunil Mohanty & Ramesh P. Rao, 2015. "Information Asymmetry about Investment Risk and Financing Choice," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7-8), pages 947-964, September.
    5. Cho, Seong-Soon & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Suh, Jungwon, 2014. "Creditor rights and capital structure: Evidence from international data," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 40-60.
    6. Koziol, Christian & Lawrenz, Jochen, 2010. "Optimal design of rating-trigger step-up bonds: Agency conflicts versus asymmetric information," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 182-204, April.
    7. Morellec, Erwan & Schürhoff, Norman, 2011. "Corporate investment and financing under asymmetric information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 262-288, February.
    8. Djaoudath Alidou, 2012. "Employees Equity Issue and Asymmetric Information:Evidence from France - Augmentations de capital réservées aux salariés et Asymétrie d’information:Cas de la France," Working Papers CREGO 1120901, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    9. Carmen Cotei & Joseph Farhat, 2011. "An application of the two-stage Bivariate Probit–Tobit model to corporate financing decisions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 363-380, October.
    10. Seifert, Bruce & Gonenc, Halit, 2012. "Issuing and repurchasing: The influence of mispricing, corporate life cycle and financing waves," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 66-81.
    11. repec:eee:quaeco:v:66:y:2017:i:c:p:225-239 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Ander Perez-Orive & Andrea Caggese, 2017. "Capital Misallocation and Secular Stagnation," 2017 Meeting Papers 382, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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    14. Sebehela, Tumellano, 2015. "Rationally financing an acquisition," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 1-20.
    15. Bessler, Wolfgang & Drobetz, Wolfgang & Haller, Rebekka & Meier, Iwan, 2013. "The international zero-leverage phenomenon," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 196-221.
    16. Drobetz, Wolfgang & Haller, Rebekka & Meier, Iwan, 2016. "Cash flow sensitivities during normal and crisis times: Evidence from shipping," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 26-49.
    17. Chay, J.B. & Park, Soon Hong & Kim, Soojung & Suh, Jungwon, 2015. "Financing hierarchy: Evidence from quantile regression," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 147-163.
    18. Clausen, Saskia & Hirth, Stefan, 2016. "Measuring the value of intangibles," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 110-127.

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