A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, April.
- Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, August.
- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
More about this item
Keywordsmajority rule; Condorcet domain; dicatorial rule; stratefy-proof;
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-10-06 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2007-10-06 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2007-10-06 (Public Economics)
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