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A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals

  • Lauren N. Merrill

    ()

    (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

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    For an odd number of individuals Campbell and Kelly [2] show that over the set of profiles that admit a strong Condorcet winner, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function. This paper shows that the situation is quite different in the case of an even number of individuals, and provides a characterization of strategy-proof social choice rules in this case.

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    File URL: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp60.pdf
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    Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 60.

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    Length: 13 pages
    Date of creation: 03 Oct 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:60
    Contact details of provider: Postal: P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
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    Web page: http://www.wm.edu/economics/

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    1. Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003. "Dictatorial domains," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08.
      • ASWAL, Navin & CHATTERJI, Shurojit & SEN, Arunava, 1999. "Dictatorial domains," CORE Discussion Papers 1999040, Universit√© catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
    3. Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, 04.
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