A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Rules over the Condorcet Domain with an Even Number of Individuals
For an odd number of individuals Campbell and Kelly  show that over the set of profiles that admit a strong Condorcet winner, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice function. This paper shows that the situation is quite different in the case of an even number of individuals, and provides a characterization of strategy-proof social choice rules in this case.
|Date of creation:||03 Oct 2007|
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- Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, 04.
- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
- Navin Aswal & Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2003.
Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 45-62, 08.
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