Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain
If the number of individuals is odd, majority rule is the only non-dictatorial strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of linear orders that admit a Condorcet winner (Campbell and Kelly, 2003). This paper shows that the claim is false when the number of individuals is even, and provides a counterpart to the theorem for the even case.
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- Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2006. "Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 81-89, January.
- Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 2000. "A simple characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 689-700.
- Kfir Eliaz, 2004. "Social aggregators," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 317-330, 04.
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