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Revelation of Information in Strategic Market Games: A Critique of Rational Expectations

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Abstract

We criticize the R.E.E. approach to asymmetric information general equilibrium because it does not explain how information gets "into" the prices. This leads to well-known paradoxes. We suggest a multiperiod game instead, where the flow of information into and out of prices is explicitly modeled. In our game Nash equilibria (N.E.) (1) generalize Walrasian equilibria to asymmetric information; (2) (2) exist generically; (3) eliminate pure speculation; (4) allow prices to reveal information and markets to become more efficient over time; (5) are consistent with the weak efficient markets hypothesis that tracking past prices is not profitable; (6) yet always lead to higher utility for better informed agents (such as experts). Throughout the paper we use one concrete game. In the last section we prove that there are a broad range of games that would have the same properties.

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  • Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 1982. "Revelation of Information in Strategic Market Games: A Critique of Rational Expectations," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 634R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 1985.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:634r
    Note: CFP 686.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Blume, Lawrence E. & Easley, David, 1982. "Learning to be rational," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 340-351, April.
    2. Jordan, J. S., 1982. "The generic existence of rational expectations equilibrium in the higher dimensional case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 224-243, April.
    3. Dubey, Pradeep & Mas-Colell, Andreau & Shubik, Martin, 1980. "Efficiency properties of strategies market games: An axiomatic approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 339-362, April.
    4. Allen, Beth E, 1981. "Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1173-1199, September.
    5. Allen, Beth, 1982. "Approximate equilibria in microeconomic rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 244-260, April.
    6. Pradeep Dubey & Mamoru Kaneko, 1982. "Information About Moves in Extensive Games: II," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Anderson, Robert M. & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1982. "On the existence of rational expectations equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 261-278, April.
    8. Pradeep Dubey & Martin Shubik, 1979. "A Strategic Market Game with Price and Quantity Strategies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 521, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    9. Bray, Margaret, 1982. "Learning, estimation, and the stability of rational expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 318-339, April.
    10. Hellwig, Martin F., 1982. "Rational expectations equilibrium with conditioning on past prices: A mean-variance example," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 279-312, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Deliberative Democracy or Market Democracy: Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and Information," Papers 03-28-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    2. Jamsheed Shorish, 2010. "Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(3), pages 351-376, June.
    3. Richard McLean & James Peck & Andrew Postlewaite, 2005. "On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Alessandro Citanna & John Donaldson & Herakles Polemarchakis & Paolo Siconolfi & Stephan E. Spear (ed.), Essays in Dynamic General Equilibrium Theory, pages 129-142, Springer.
    4. Matthew O. Jackson & James Peck, 1993. "Costly Information Acquisition," Discussion Papers 1087, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Michael Ostrovsky, 2012. "Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets With Strategic Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(6), pages 2595-2647, November.
    6. James Peck & Matthew O. Jackson, 1999. "Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 603-628.
    7. Martin Shubik, 1977. "A Theory of Money and Financial Institutions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 462, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 1988. "Default and Efficiency in a General Equilibrium Model with Incomplete Markets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 879R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 1989.
    9. Beth Allen & James S. Jordan, 1998. "The existence of rational expectations equilibrium: a retrospective," Staff Report 252, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

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