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Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond

Author

Listed:
  • Navin Kartik

    (Yale University, Department of Economics)

  • Francesco Squintani

    (University of Warwick, Department of Economics)

  • Katrin Tinn

    (McGill University, Desautels Faculty of Management)

Abstract

We study two-player constant-sum Bayesian games with type-independent payoffs. Under a "completeness" statistical condition, any "identifiable" equilibrium is an ex-post equilibrium. We apply this result to a Downsian election in which office-motivated candidates possess private information about policy consequences. The ex-post property implies a sharp bound on information aggregation: equilibrium voter welfare is at best equal to the efficient use of a single candidate's information. In canonical specifications, politicians may "anti-pander" (overreact to their information), whereas some degree of pandering would be socially beneficial. We discuss other applications of the ex-post result.

Suggested Citation

  • Navin Kartik & Francesco Squintani & Katrin Tinn, 2025. "Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2484, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2484
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2026-01/d2484.pdf
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