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Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises



We analyze the effect of risk aversion, wealth and portfolios on the behavior of investors in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices. The model generates a rich set of striking theoretical predictions. For example, risk aversion makes currency crises significantly less likely; increased wealth makes crises more likely; and foreign direct investment (illiquid investments in the target currency) make crises more likely. Our results extend linearly to a heterogeneous agent population.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernardo Guimaraes & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-fulfilling Currency Crises," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1433, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1433

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    1. David Frankel & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(1), pages 285-304.
    2. Heinemann, Frank & Illing, Gerhard, 2002. "Speculative attacks: unique equilibrium and transparency," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 429-450, December.
    3. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    4. Giancarlo Corsetti & Amil Dasgupta & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2004. "Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 87-113.
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    7. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
    8. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2005. "Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 45-78, September.
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    12. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-325, August.
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    14. Christian Gollier, 2004. "The Economics of Risk and Time," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262572249, January.
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    1. repec:ces:eeagre:v::y:2004:i::p:1-148 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lars Calmfors & Giancarlo Corsetti & Seppo Honkapohja & John Kay & Willi Leibfritz & Gilles Saint-Paul & Hans-Werner Sinn & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Acceding Countries: The Road to the Euro," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo Group Munich, vol. 0, pages 119-136, October.

    More about this item


    Currency crisis; Sunspots; Global games; Risk aversion; Wealth; Portfolio;

    JEL classification:

    • F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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