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Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Endogenous Vertical Differentiation

  • Lin Liu

    ()

    (School of Business Administration, China University of Petroleum, Beijing Campus)

  • Yuanzhu Lu

    ()

    (China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics)

We consider a game of endogenous timing with observable delay in a mixed duopoly with endogenous vertical differentiation in the context of sequential quality and price choice. We find that a simultaneous play in the first opportunity at each stage turns out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.

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Paper provided by China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics in its series CEMA Working Papers with number 452.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cuf:wpaper:452
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://cema.cufe.edu.cn/

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  1. Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  2. Lambertini, Luca, 1999. "Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 101-109, March.
  3. Juan Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price Competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 263-272, July.
  4. Flavio Delbono & Vincenzo Denicolo' & Carlo Scarpa, 1991. "Quality Choice in a Vertically Differentiated Mixed Duopoly," Working Papers 108, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  5. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13, January.
  6. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
  7. Koji Ishibashi & Toyokazu Kaneko, 2008. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 213-231, December.
  8. Yuanzhu Lu, 2005. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case," CEMA Working Papers 506, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
  9. Lambertini, Luca, 1996. "Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously Differentiated Products," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(67), pages 205-24, December.
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