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Combining the endogenous choice of timing and competition version in a mixed duopoly

Author

Listed:
  • Hong-Ren Din

    () (TransWorld University)

  • Chia-Hung Sun

    () (Soochow University)

Abstract

Abstract This paper extends Sun (Econ Lett 120:364–368, 2013) conceptcombining the endogenous choice of timing and competition version from a pure duopoly model to a mixed duopoly model. We find that choosing a price contract and playing in the first period make up a dominant strategy for the private firm. The public firm’s best response to the private firm’s dominant strategy is also to choose a price contract and play in the first period. As a result, simultaneous price competition is the unique equilibrium outcome, no matter whether the goods are substitutes or complements. Combining the findings in Sun (Econ Lett 120:364–368, 2013), we present that simultaneous price competition is the unique result with complement products, irrespective of whether for a pure duopoly model or for a mixed duopoly model.

Suggested Citation

  • Hong-Ren Din & Chia-Hung Sun, 2016. "Combining the endogenous choice of timing and competition version in a mixed duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(2), pages 141-166, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:118:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-015-0470-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00712-015-0470-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:kap:jeczfn:v:124:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00712-017-0565-1 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sang-Ho Lee & Lili Xu, 2018. "Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(2), pages 175-201, June.
    3. Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2018. "Endogenous timing with a socially responsible firm," MPRA Paper 83968, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot competition; Bertrand competition; Endogenous competition version; Endogenous timing; Mixed duopoly;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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