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Landlords and sharecroppers in wine producing regions: Beaujolais, Catalonia and Tuscany, 1800-1940

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Listed:
  • Carmona, Juan
  • Simpson, James

Abstract

The growing success of small family farms in Europe before 1930 was found alongside large estates. Tenanted estates enjoyed the advantages of the greater incentives of family farmers to maximize their production, and the economies of scale for marketing, credit or technical improvement of large exploitations. A particular case is the tenanted estates specialized in the production and marketing of wine and using sharecropping contracts. Technical changes, the increasing of scale economies in wine production, and the impact of Phylloxera after 1870 had an impact in the nature of the contract as landlords increasing the control on production. This paper compares the three specific cases of Beaujolais, Catalonia and Tuscany, where tenanted wine producing estates were common throughout this period, and the responses of owners and settlers to these changes in the long term.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmona, Juan & Simpson, James, 2021. "Landlords and sharecroppers in wine producing regions: Beaujolais, Catalonia and Tuscany, 1800-1940," IFCS - Working Papers in Economic History.WH 32582, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Figuerola.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:whrepe:32582
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Samuel Garrido, 2017. "Sharecropping was sometimes efficient: sharecropping with compensation for improvements in European viticulture," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 70(3), pages 977-1003, August.
    2. Simpson,James & Carmona,Juan, 2020. "Why Democracy Failed," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108487481, June.
    3. Hoffman, Philip T., 1984. "The Economic Theory of Sharecropping in Early Modern France," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 309-319, June.
    4. Ackerberg, Daniel A. & Botticini, Maristella, 2000. "The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 241-257, July.
    5. repec:bla:econom:v:63:y:1996:i:251:p:445-57 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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