Incentives to Invest in Short-term vs. Long-term Contracts: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
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- Dubois, Pierre & Vukina, Tomislav, 2009. "Incentives to Invest in Short-term vs. Long-term Contracts: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," IDEI Working Papers 590, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Dec 2009.
References listed on IDEAS
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