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¿Son los contratos agrarios un factor determinante del crecimiento económico? El ejemplo de la aparcería en los siglos XIX-XX

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  • Simpson, James
  • Carmona, Juan

Abstract

La aparcería es una institución que, muy a menudo, se ha asociado a la miseria de los campesinos y al atraso o estancamiento agrario. Es un contrato en apariencia poco eficiente, 10 que no ha impedido su gran difusión e incluso su persistencia en la actualidad (al menos en gran parte de Asia), coexistiendo, curiosamente, con otros sistemas aparentemente más eficientes, como el cultivo directo con mano de obra familiar, cultivo con mano de obra asalariada o sistemas de tenencia como el arrendamiento. Los altos niveles de renta, la escasez de capital de los aparceros y, normalmente, la desigual distribución de la propiedad con la que va asociada la aparcería, ha favorecido las tesis que explican su existencia en términos de explotación del campesinado, cuando no se considera un residuo feudal dentro del sistema capitalista y que ha pervivido por motivos históricos o institucionales. Sin embargo, estudios recientes basados en aportaciones de la teoría de los contratos agrarios ponen en duda la ineficiencia de la aparcería como tal. El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar algunos de los problemas que plantean algunas interpretaciones habituales de los sistemas de tenencia, y ofrecer algunas interpretaciones alternativas que relacionan la la elección de un determinado sistema de tenencia con un conjunto de restricciones que pueden cambiar en el tiempo.

Suggested Citation

  • Simpson, James & Carmona, Juan, 1999. "¿Son los contratos agrarios un factor determinante del crecimiento económico? El ejemplo de la aparcería en los siglos XIX-XX," IFCS - Working Papers in Economic History.WH dh991304, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto Figuerola.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:whrepe:dh991304
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