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Heterogeneous Tiebout communities with private production and anonymous crowding

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  • Luque, Jaime

Abstract

his paper examines, in the context of a multiple types of consumers, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions under which equilibrium and optimum exist, and involve mixing types of consumers in jurisdictions. Pricing includes visa permits for entry. Following Berglas (1976), we assume anonymous crowding and complementarities in production. For a large economy, we prove existence of equilibrium and the first and second welfare theorems. Our simultaneous optimization approach provides a new technique for showing existence of equilibrium in local public good economies with local production and a continuum of agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Luque, Jaime, 2011. "Heterogeneous Tiebout communities with private production and anonymous crowding," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1028, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we1028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hervés-Beloso, Carlos & Moreno-García, Emma, 2009. "Walrasian analysis via two-player games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 220-233, January.
    2. de Bartolome, Charles A M, 1990. "Equilibrium and Inefficiency in a Community Model with Peer Group Effects," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 110-133, February.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies

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