On Committed Citizen-Candidates
I study if the equilibria of the citizen-candidate model analyzed in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) are robust to some degree of commitment from candidates. In analogy with their notion of "sincere" voting, I consider one of "sincere" commitment: commitment is costless to positions closer to one's ideal point than any other candidate's position, but it is too costly to positions further away. With "sincere" voting this ensures candidates always vote for themselves. I show hat, for the most common population distributions, all the multiple candidate equilibria analyzed in Osborne and Slivinski (1996) are not equilibria in this model, as the unique equilibrium with four or less candidates has a single candidate entering.
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tim Besley & Stephen Coate, .
"An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
ecf70d639d700dba5327ab0c8, Penn Economics Department.
- Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996.
"A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
- Martin J. Osborne & Al Slivinksi, 1995. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," Department of Economics Working Papers 1995-01, McMaster University.
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