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Discriminating to learn to discriminate

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  • Hauk, Esther

Abstract

Experiments in which subjects play simultaneously several finite prisoner's dilemma supergames reveal that many hypotheses used in the literature to explain cooperation are wrong. In particular the existence of player types is rejected as well as over-simplified behavioural postulates which allow for the existence of agents who make consistent errors. Experimental subjects turn out to permanently search for a better strategy. It is further suggested that the freedom to choose whether or not to play the prisoner's dilemma might be a key element in explaining observed cooperation levels in real data

Suggested Citation

  • Hauk, Esther, 1997. "Discriminating to learn to discriminate," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6058, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:6058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tilman Slembeck, 1999. "A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics - Towards an Economic Theory of Contingent Learning," Microeconomics 9905001, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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